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Winners and Losers in the Communications Sector:
An Examination of Digital Television Regulation in
the United Kingdom
Eliza Varney∗
INTRODUCTION
Commercial pressures have weakened the adoption of
regulatory measures designed to safeguard the interests of the
public in the communications sector. Regulators have been
drawn into leaving aside the protection of citizenship interests
and adopting a perception of the public exclusively as economic
actors.
In the absence of “heightened public interest
requirements,”1 the safeguarding of citizenship-related
concerns is nothing more than an ongoing Sisyphean struggle.
Any attempt to protect these interests is rolling into the “abyss
of unbridled commercialism.”2
Professor Anthony Varona has asserted that the United
States is witnessing an “increased commodification of viewers”3
in a legal context in which the market players seem to set the
rules of the game. This article assesses the extent to which a
similar phenomenon is taking place within the context of the
United Kingdom. I will focus on the regulation of digital
television (DTV) infrastructure. I intend to demonstrate that
the concerns identified by Professor Varona in relation to
∗ Lecturer in Law, University of Keele Law School, Staffordshire,
United Kingdom. This article is based on a paper presented at the ITS
Europe, 15th Biennial Conference: "Changing Peoples, Societies and
Companies: Telecommunications in the 21st Century", Berlin, Germany,
September 4-7, 2004. I would like to thank Mike Feintuck and Mike Varney
for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. Any errors and
omissions are, of course, my own.
1. Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The
Failure and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 91 (2004).
2. Mike Feintuck, Walking the High-Wire: The UK’s Draft
Communications Bill, 9 EUR. PUB. L. 105, 122 (2003).
3. Varona, supra note 1, at 66.
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programming permeate the entire DTV supply chain.
Regulation of DTV infrastructure involves both an economic
and a public policy dimension, and protection of citizenship
interests should not be limited to content-related issues. In
fact, ensuring digital broadcasters’ access to DTV’s
infrastructure is instrumental in ensuring public access to
information.4
This article focuses on the United Kingdom’s
Part I concentrates on
Communications Act of 2003.5
noneconomic aspects the United Kingdom’s regulation of DTV
infrastructure, particularly tools for protecting citizenship
concerns associated with the communications sector. Part II is
concerned with the extent to which the Act protects consumerrelated interest implicit in the economic aspects of DTV
infrastructure. This part refers mainly to technical and
competition-related concerns, placing particular emphasis on
the issue of interoperability and access to bottlenecks.6 This
article concludes that although the Act responds to the
technical aspects of DTV infrastructure, it has failed to
adequately address public policy concerns within the
communications sector. In a fashion similar to Professor
Varona’s criticism of American communications law, I attribute
this deplorable status quo to the influence exercised by market
4. Christopher T. Marsden, for example, notes that three factors are
necessary in order to ensure pluralism and diversity in the media sector:
ownership rules to guarantee a diversity of market players, the “reinvention of
public service broadcasting” to ensure the public has access to information and
access to bottlenecks. Christopher T. Marsden, Pluralism in the MultiChannel Market, Suggestions for Regulatory Scrutiny, 4 INT’L. J. COMM. L. &
POL’Y. 1, 14-15 (2000).
5. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030021.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2005). The Communications Act implements the 2002 Directives on
electronic communications in the United Kingdom. Among the major changes
in the regulation of electronic communications is the removal of the
requirement of individual licensing of telecommunication systems. This
article is concerned with interoperability and access-related aspects in the
regulation of bottlenecks in digital television. For an analysis of the new
framework, see generally John Cassels, Communications Bill – The Vital
Facts, 12 UTIL. L. REV. 90 (2001); Marly Didizian & Vanessa Shield, The
Communications Bill – Completing the Picture, 8 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L.
REV. 167 (2002); Feintuck, supra note 2; Graeme Maguire & Jason Romer, An
Overview of the Draft United Kingdom Communications Bill, 8 COMPUTER &
TELECOMM. L. REV. 136 (2002).
6. Bottlenecks are points of strategic control in the DTV supply chain.
See generally Dermot Nolan, Bottlenecks in Pay Television, Impact on Market
Developments in Europe, 21 TELECOMM. POL’Y. 597 (1997).
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players over regulators. This article emphasizes the need for
regulation based on a clear notion of the “public interest,”
incorporating not only economic but also social interests.
I. SHAKY GROUND FOR PROTECTING CITIZENSHIP
INTERESTS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR?
The Communications Act failed to adequately address the
public policy implications of bottlenecks.7 The bottlenecks
debate cannot be limited to purely economic matters. The
debate also involves a range of noneconomic citizenship-related
interests in pluralism and diversity in the communications
market. In his analysis of American law, Professor Varona has
argued that “[o]ver the last twenty-five years, the FCC has
repealed almost all of its substantive public interest
regulations, relying instead on marketplace forces in the
individual television markets . . . to guide broadcasters’
decisions concerning the nature and content of all of their
programming.”8 Regulation of infrastructure has followed a
similar path. Rather than balancing the public’s noneconomic
interests with market-related concerns, regulators have
fraternized with commercial players and minimized legal
references to “the public interest” in the communications
sector.9 On both sides of the Atlantic, market-oriented policies
7. For further reference to the “public policy” implications of the
bottlenecks challenge, see Nikos Nikolinakos, The New Legal Framework for
Digital Gateways: The Complementary Nature of Competition Law and Sector
Specific Regulation, 21 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 408, 408 (2000).
[M]arket players who control the bottlenecks in question will have the
commercial incentive to extend their power to the provision of
content. This can be done, for instance, when gatekeepers block or
limit consumer access via their set-top boxes to certain programme
services. Therefore, the bottleneck issue must be tackled not only
because of its anti-competitive effects but also because of certain
public policy priorities, for instance the preservation of pluralism.
Id. at 408.
8. Varona, supra note 1, at 5.
9. The term “public interest” implies opposition to private interests. In
his interpretation of the “public interest,” Harm Schepel refers to the
definition advanced in Librandi v. Cuttica, 1998 ECR I – 5955: “the interests
of the collectivity had to prevail over the private interests of individual
operators.” Harm Schepel, Delegation of Regulatory Powers to Private Parties
Under EC Competition Law: Towards a Procedural Public Interest Test, 39
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 31, 49 (2002). Schepel emphasizes that “[t]he
appropriate distinction is between decisions taken in the advancement of the
collective good and decisions taken in the pursuit of narrow private interests.”
Id. See generally MIKE FEINTUCK, MEDIA REGULATION, PUBLIC INTEREST AND
THE LAW (1999).
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have become the norm and have undermined the legal
protection of citizenship interests.
Within the United Kingdom, the Draft Communications
Bill developed a “light touch” regulatory approach,10 based on
the view that regulatory intervention should occur only if
needed.11 The Joint Committee on the Draft Communications
Bill criticized this approach:
We support the duty on OFCOM [the Office of Communications] to
have regard to the principles that regulatory activities should be
‘“proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which action
is needed.’” We recommend that these principles, rather than an
undefined commitment to ‘“light touch’” regulation, should govern the
provisions of the final Bill regarding regulatory burdens.12

Although the Communications Act omitted the reference to
“light touch” regulation,13 it maintained the trend toward
reducing regulatory intervention.14 According to the Act,
10. Dep’t of Trade and Indus., 2002 Draft Communications Bill, cl.
5(1)(a)(b),
available
at
http://www.communicationsbill.gov.uk/pdf/
clauses_part1.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). “Duties to secure light touch
regulation: (1) OFCOM shall keep the carrying out of their functions under
review with a view to securing that regulation by OFCOM does not involve (a)
the imposition of burdens which are unnecessary; or (b) the maintenance of
burdens which have become unnecessary.”
11. Id. cl. 3(2)(a).
12. Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill,
Session 2001-02, HL Paper 169-1, HC 876-1, 23-24 [hereinafter Puttnam
Report]; see also Feintuck, supra note 2, at 118 (“The Puttnam Report
identifies the obligation to engage in ‘light touch’ regulation as a potential
obstacle to Ofcom’s effective operation—a term which might be thrown back in
Ofcom’s face on any occasion when it attempts tough or firm regulatory
intervention.”). The Communications Act establishes OFCOM as the single
regulator for the communications sector. OFCOM unites the functions of the
Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), Independent Television Commission
(ITC), Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), Radio Communications
Agency, and Radio Authority. For the transfer of jurisdictions to the new
regulator, see The Office of Communications Act 2002 (Commencement No. 3)
and Communications Act 2003 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2003, (2003) SI
3142
(C.
125),
available
at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2003/20033142.htm. See generally
Stuart Weinstein, OFCOM, Information Convergence and the Never Ending
Drizzle of Electric Rain, 8 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004).
13. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 6 (Eng.) (referring to the
“duties to review regulatory burdens”).
14. References to “light touch” regulation may have been eliminated from
the Communications Act, but not from the language of regulators and of the
Government. Lord Currie, for example, referred to “light touch” in relation to
the functions of OFCOM in his speech to the Guardian Media Lecture: “we
will seek to regulate only where regulation is necessary, and will then look for
the least intrusive method possible to achieve our policy goals and public
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“OFCOM must have regard, in all cases, to . . . the principles
under which regulatory activities should be transparent,
accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at
cases in which action is needed.”15 Similarly, under European
Union law, OFCOM bears a duty to “encourage . . . the
provision of network access and service interoperability.”16 The
choice of the term “encourage” rather than “ensure,” places
more weight on the will of the market players rather than on
the regulators. It advances the tendency toward “light touch”
rather than active regulatory intervention for bottlenecks in
digital television. A similar approach has been adopted in the
2002 European Union Directives.17 The Communications Act
reflects the regulatory attitude advanced at the European level.
The Communications Act is intended as a deregulatory
instrument. The new measure “has proposed a far more
deregulatory and liberalising regime than” many observers had
expected.18 “[O]verall, the buzz word for this brave new world
is ‘deregulation.’ To its advocates, less regulation will permit
the creation of British media giants capable of competing on a
world stage . . . .”19 This deregulatory posture, however,
sacrifices the interest of the public, which can be adequately
protected only by active regulatory intervention.20 The recent
duties.” OFCOM Chairman David Currie, Speech to the Radio Festival of the
Guardian Media Lecture (Jul. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Currie Speech], available
at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-office/speeches_presentations (last visited
Apr. 19, 2005).
15. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(3)(a) (Eng.).
16. Id. § 4(7).

17. See Council Directive 2002/19/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter
Access
Directive],
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/ l_10820020424en00070020.pdf; Council Directive
2002/20/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter Authorisation Directive], available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/
2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00210032.pdf; Council Directive 2002/21/EC,
2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter Framework Directive], available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/
dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00330050.pdf; Council Directive 2002/22/EC,
2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter Universal Service Directive], available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/
l_10820020424en00510077.pdf.
18. Maguire & Rower, supra note 5, at 140.
19. Thomas Crane & Rico Calleja, The Communications Bill – New Dawn
or False Dawn?, 7 COMM. L. 116, 116 (2002).
20. See Owen Gibson, Peer Joins Communications Bill Protest, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 3, 2002 (expressing some peers’ concern that the bill would
fail to protect the public against commercial interests), available at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4550456-107065,00.html.
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measures at both the European and domestic level retreat from
active regulatory intervention, favoring the application of
general competition law. Comments on the 2002 Directives
emphasize:
A key principle underpinning the proposals is the need to move away
from sector-specific ex-ante regulation towards greater reliance on the
use of competition law in the communications sector. This can be
seen as an attempt by the Commission to use competition law as a
tool to address perceived weaknesses in the individual ex-ante
regulatory regimes of the Member States.21

Similarly, OFCOM’s requirement of promoting competition
is perceived as part of the “duties for the purpose of fulfilling
OFCOM will have concurrent
community obligations.”22
powers with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in competitionrelated matters for the communications sector.23 Graeme
Maguire and Jason Rower identify the Government’s intention
that these matters will be exercised primarily by the
communications regulator:
The shift that is likely to result is that broadcasting competition
issues, generally dealt with by the OFT at present will, in the future,
fall within OFCOM’s ambit. The Government also expects that as
sector specific regulation is rolled back, so OFCOM will be able to rely
increasingly on general competition powers as opposed to sectorspecific regulations.24

Lord Currie links the notion of “light touch” regulation
with the prospect if the withdrawal of regulatory intervention
in competitive markets.25 Nevertheless, regulation must not be
perceived as temporary, until the market is competitive.26 In
21. Theresa Gourlay & Julia Hemmings, Proposed Directives on Access
and Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 7
COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 199, 200 (2001).
22. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 4(3) (Eng.).
23. Maguire & Romer, supra note 5, at 138.
24. Id.
25. “Staying with the notion of ‘light touch’ for a moment, we intend that
in due course the development of competition will mean that there will be
areas of regulation from which we can withdraw altogether.” Currie Speech,
supra note 14.
26. A similar debate was advanced in relation to private utilities in that
regulation is “a matter of ‘holding the fort’ until competition arrives.” COSMO
GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 152
(Hart Pub’g, 2000). Referring to the 1983 Littlechild Report, Graham argued
that “the Report assumes that regulation is a temporary phenomenon and that
competition will develop speedily so that regulation is no longer needed.” Id.
at 151. Graham wrote that, in fact, the arrival of competition did not mean
that regulation withered away. “What we can see is an increasing emphasis
on issues of competition policy and consumer protection, and a concern with

VARNEY_FINAL_4-24-05

2005]

11/07/2006 18:43:59

WINNERS AND LOSERS

651

Cosmo Graham’s terms, “the regulators will have responsibility
for ensuring that companies meet their social obligations,
which may be defined in a variety of different ways . . . . So,
overall, although the form and instruments of regulation are
changing, the activity is not likely to wither away.”27
An effective approach for controlling the communications
sector must comprise both competition and sector-specific
Competition authorities perceive the public
regulation.28
exclusively as consumers, balancing their interests with the
interest of market players. On the other hand, an active
regulatory approach favors the perception of the public not just
as economic actors, but also as citizens. Furthermore, this
approach comes alongside the need to emphasize the interest of
the public over commercial interests.
Initially, the Draft Bill advanced a set of regulatory
objectives that ignored the public’s noneconomic interests.29
This was also reflected in the access and interoperability
their inter-relationship.” Id. at 189.
27. Id. at 194. “[I]t would thus seem clear that regulation will have a
considerable place in the new media environment; arguments that it will
wither away are based on grossly simplistic assumptions as to the reasons for
regulation and an over-optimism as to the likely openness of future market
structures.”
David Goldberg et al., Conclusions, in REGULATING THE
CHANGING MEDIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 307 (David Goldberg et al. eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
28. Regulation must be maintained in order to safeguard the interest of
citizens and consumers:
There is a clear role for ex ante sector specific regulation which can
establish regulatory outcomes that are certain as industry players
invest in new services and technologies. . . . [I]n such a rapidly
developing sector, in some cases anti-competitive positions could
become entrenched before ex post competition regulation has
addressed the issues fully.
BRITISH BROAD. CORP., RESPONSE TO EU CONVERGENCE WORKING DOCUMENT
(SEC (98) 1284), DETAILED RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS § 1.27 (Nov. 1998)
RESPONSE],
available
at
[hereinafter
BBC’S
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/workdoc/bbc.html. Similarly, Lord
Puttnam argues that “[w]e must . . . dispel the current fantasy that should
unacceptable levels of ownership emerge, regulators can move swiftly to put
the genie back in the bottle.” 648 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1432 (daily ed.
June 5, 2003) (statement of Lord Puttnam) [hereinafter Puttnam Statement],
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds03/
text/3060501.htm; see also Andrew Murray & Colin Scott, Controlling the New
Media: Hybrid Responses to New Forms of Power, 65 MOD. L. REV. 491 (2002).
29. One of OFCOM’s objectives is “to further the interests of the persons
who are customers for the services and facilities in relation to which OFCOM
have functions.” 2002 Draft Communications Bill, supra note 10, cl. 3(1)(a).
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provisions. Clause 4(8) gave priority to competition concerns,
and treated consumer-related interests as afterthoughts.30 The
Draft Bill, as well as the 2002 Directives,31 did not place
sufficient emphasis on the noneconomic “public policy”
dimension of regulating bottlenecks in digital television.
The Puttnam Report, which contains the recommendations
of the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and the House of
Commons for the scrutiny of the Draft Bill, has criticized the
Communication Act’s failure to give sufficient emphasis to the
noneconomic interests.
The report condemns failure to
prioritize the interests of consumers in relation to the functions
of OFCOM. “There is no indication in the Directive or the
Draft Bill of priority between the five requirements, which
relate to the promotion of competition, the development of the
internal market and the promotion of the interests of citizens . .
. .”32 While welcoming the suggestion of the Joint Committee,
the Government insisted that “the duties properly reflect the
breadth of all OFCOM’s responsibilities, both economic and
cultural, and follow the proposition set out in the White Paper
that each duty is of equal weight.”33
Section 3 of the Communications Act, however, states that
“[i]t shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in carrying out its
30. Similarly, the conditions advanced in clause 41(5) of the Bill are
designed to “ensur[e] a level of network access and interoperability that will
promote efficiency, sustainable competition and benefit to consumers.” See
Puttnam Report, supra note 12, at 45.
31. The actual provisions of the Bill need to be contrasted with the
Government’s comments on these measures. “In all of these changes, the
interests of citizens come first, whether as consumers, as viewers and
listeners, or as participants in democracy.” Press Notice, U.K. Department of
Trade & Indus. & Dep’t for Culture, Media & Sport (DTI–DCMS), Draft Bill
Overhauls Legal Framework for Communications Industry (May 7, 2002),
available at http://www.communicationsbill.gov.uk/press_notices.html.
32. Puttnam Report, supra note 12, at 9-10. Similarly, in relation to the
privatized utilities, Graham notes that “[t]he legislation does not . . . provide
guidance in prioritising the various interests . . . . The regulators have tended
to place most emphasis on their economic duties, in particular, the duty to
promote competition, arguing that this is in the consumers’ long term
interests.” GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 32. He adds that “it would be equally
tenable to see even in the existing legislation as requiring a balanced approach
to the issues of economic and social obligations.” Id.
33. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS. & DEP’T OF CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT,
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
DRAFT COMMUNICATIONS BILL, 2002, Cm 5646, at 3, available at
http://www.communicationsbill.gov.uk. The Bill identifies OFCOM’s duty: “to
further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by
promoting competition.” Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(1)(b) (Eng.).
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functions, to promote the interest of citizens and consumers in
the communications market.”34 Nevertheless, it is essential to
ensure that this primacy given to the interest of the public is
adequately reflected in practice and that regulators do not yield
to the pressures posed by commercial interests.35
The references in the Act to citizens’ interests are scarce.36
The competition-oriented approach reflected in the Draft Bill’s
access and interoperability provisions for bottlenecks remained
The present regulatory system
unaffected in the Act.37
manifests a tendency toward economic as opposed to social
regulation.38 Similarly, in the context of utility privatization,
regulators were mainly entrusted with economic duties, and
social concerns were of a merely secondary nature.39 Cosmo
Graham has called for an acknowledgement of social concerns,
in addition to the economic aims pursued by the regulators:40
“there is no obstacle, conceptually, in thinking about access to
utility services in terms of individual rights, in the sense of an
entitlement as part of citizenship.”41
34. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(1) (Eng.).
35. Regulators’ lack of enthusiasm concerning the amendments to section
3 is illustrative of this danger. See, e.g., Julia Day, OFCOM Boss Voices Fear
Over Media Bill, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2003 (stating that, according to Lord
Currie, “the Puttnam amendment places more emphasis on the wider cultural
interest of the citizen, rather than the commercial interests of the consumer,
which would ‘create long term difficulties’ for the new regulator”), available at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4707983-111156,00.html.
36. References to citizens are included only three times in the
Communications Act, under sections 3(1), 3(14), and 4. See Communications
Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 3-4 (Eng.).
37. For example, the wording in section 4(8) of the Communications Act,
2003, c. 21, § 4(8) (Eng.) under the duties to fulfill Community obligations,
remained the same as put forward by clause 4(7) of the 2002 Draft
Communications Bill, where promotion of competition was given a much
stronger emphasis than the need to ensure the benefit of “customers.”
38. See generally Paul S. Crampton & Brian A. Facey, Revisiting
Regulation and Deregulation Through the Lens of Competition Policy; Getting
the Balance Right, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 25 (2002) (discussing various
theories of regulation).
39. See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 142.
40. “Over the years . . . there has been the increasing importance of
quality of service matters which has brought along with it greater
consideration of social matters.” Id. at 143.
41. Id.; see also Goldberg et al., supra note 27, at 301 (“[The] argument for
regulation . . . does not concern itself with the existence of limits on the
operation of markets . . . but assumes that markets will marginalize some sort
of programming and . . . in the long run diminish consumer choice.”). The
market players with the potential for affecting this “marginalization” are the
bottleneck’s control. This proves once again that the bottleneck challenge
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Unfortunately, the Act fails to acknowledge the public
policy dimension of the bottlenecks challenge. In the context of
utility privatization, critics decried a perception of the public as
“simply consumers of commodities.”42 Privatization on this
model represented “an attempt to break through old problems
by re-conceptualizing the relationship between individuals and
the state organs as one whereby the individual is a consumer of
public services, rather than a citizen of a political
community.”43 The Act’s references to the public mainly in
terms of consumers, customers, or end users further reinforces
the treatment of the public as economic actors as opposed to
citizens.44
There is a need to restore democratic regulatory
rationales45 and to interpret the “public interest” so that it
reflects not only economic but also social interests.46 Similar to
the situation that Anthony Varona has identified within
American law,47 the British framework relies on a vague notion
of “the public interest”:
In failing to explore adequately what might be termed in this sense
‘the public interest’, the government has failed to establish much
needed more solid foundations for regulatory intervention in the
modern era . . . . [A]n opportunity has been missed to set up a safety
net of constitutional principle, to come into play if the balance pole
proves insufficient in keeping the regulatory endeavor on its narrow
and difficult traverse of the high-wire.48

involves more than just economic concerns.
42. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 87.
43. Id. Graham comments further that “[c]haracterising the recipients of
utility services as consumers does not provide a magical solution to policy
problems.” Id. at 88.
44. “[I]t may be that ‘citizen interests’ should have ranked alongside, or
even above, ‘consumer interests’, and, as was suggested in the process of prelegislative scrutiny, . . . ‘effective regulation’ should be as important as
lightness of touch.” Feintuck, supra note 2, at 113. In the context of the
privatized utilities, Graham notes that “the regulators do have social
obligations which may well pull in opposite directions from the economic
obligations, notably the duty to promote competition . . . these social
obligations should be seen as rights for consumers, or, more accurately, rights
for citizens.” GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 32.
45. This would require what Graham calls “going back to the
fundamentals.” GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 198. He notes further that “[i]t
may be that we have now gone as far as we can by evolutionary change and,
instead we have to turn our attention to first principles for the first time in
many years.” Id.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Varona, supra note 1, at 4, 52, 56, 69.
48. Feintuck, supra note 2, at 108; see also Varona, supra note 1, at 8
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Following the pressure faced by the Draft Bill in the House
of Lords, the public interest requirement for newspaper
mergers has been extended to mergers in the broadcasting
sector.49 This is seen as a counterbalance to the deregulatory
approach in the new legal framework for electronic
In Lord Puttnam’s terms, the public
communications.50
interest test is seen as “a powerful player in behalf of the
The effectiveness of this test will depend on
citizen.”51
OFCOM’s commitment to protecting citizens’ interests.52
Furthermore, the government will retain the final say over
mergers. “[T]he problem is where the ultimate decision lies . . .
. At three separate points in the objection process, it is up to
the secretary of state for trade and industry (whose first
priority is not the public interest) to make a decision.”53 The
(“The FCC’s proceeding on new public interest duties is still open, with no new
public interest requirements on the horizon.”).
49. For the public interest requirement in relation to newspaper mergers,
see Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 375-377 (Eng.). The extension of the
public interest requirement to mergers in the broadcasting sector appears in
sections 378-380. Id. §§ 378-380 (Eng.). The public interest amendments are
part of the Enterprise Act, Chapter 2. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.); see
Graeme Young & Martin Myers, The Future Regulation of Media Mergers, 15
ENT. L. R. 129, 129 (2004); Owen Gibson, Media Bill Set to Become Law
Within a Fortnight, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2003, available at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,47075833-10765,00.html.
The
newspaper and the broadcasting sectors are among the few exceptions in
which the government still has the final say in over mergers. In the majority
of merger cases, the 2002 Enterprise Act transferred the responsibility from
ministers to the OFT and the Competition Commission. See Shaun Goodman.,
Steady as She Goes: The Enterprise Act 2002 Charts a Familiar Course for UK
Merger Control, 8 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 321, 331-46 (2003); Cosmo
Graham, The Enterprise Act 2002 and Competition Law, 67 MOD. L. REV. 273,
278, 280 (2004).
50. See generally Young & Myers, supra note 49 (discussing the impact of
public interest requirements on media mergers).
51. Puttnam Statement, supra note 28, at 1433; see also Curbing Media
GUARDIAN,
July
1,
2003,
available
at
Mergers,
THE
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/
0,3858,4702541-107065,00.html
(summarizing that “[a]ll the clause requires is that the media mergers should
be subjected to a plurality test, defined as commitment to ‘a balanced and
impartial presentation of news and comment.’”).
52. “A lot will depend on how OFCOM, which under chairman Lord
Currie has promised to retain a ‘light touch’, chooses to interpret the public
interest rules.” Owen Gibson, Cross-Media Ownership, THE GUARDIAN, July
8, 2003, available at http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,470778110765,00.html.
53. Steven Barnett, Westminster Sells Media Sown the River, THE
GUARDIAN,
July
14,
2003,
available
at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4712245-105333,00.html.
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secretary will decide whether OFCOM should assess the public
interest implications of a proposed merger.54 The government
is not bound to follow the recommendations of OFCOM or the
This commercially oriented
Competition Commission.55
approach for interpreting the public interest is characteristic of
a “market-obsessed government . . . vulnerable to the pressure
from media barons.”56
Unfortunately, the current framework reflects a perception
of the public interest based on “economic rationale[s] of wealth
maximization, to the exclusion of democratic imperatives.”57
The law leaves citizenship-related interests vulnerable to
The public interest must be
commercial pressures.58
distinguished from purely economic ends, and it must include a
range of noneconomic interests. “[T]here has been greater
stress on ensuring that the benefits of competition are shared
equally and a general recognition that there are some, illdefined, social obligations . . . these social obligations could be
seen as citizens’ rights.”59
Regulation needs to be based on clear objectives, and must
be designed to safeguard the interest of the public, perceived as
both citizens and consumers. 60 Effective regulation demands
“reflection on the standards and principles which govern how
the media, and those who regulate them, operate.”61 It is more
and more difficult to guarantee diversity, pluralism, and access
if the public is described in impersonal terms such as
“customers” or “end users.” In this context, the new measures

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. MIKE FEINTUCK, “THE PUBLIC INTEREST” IN REGULATION 26 (2004).
58. Id. In addition, in relation to privatized utilities, Graham has
acknowledged how the 1998 Human Rights Act and the influence exercised by
the European Union have spurred the “growing importance of citizenship
issues.” GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 129.
59. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 4.
60. “[I]n the absence of the adoption of citizenship, or arguably some other
clear rationale, fundamental and systematic reform of the regulatory regime,
and therefore effective and rational regulation, will remain depressingly
unlikely.” Mike Feintuck, Regulating the Media Revolution: In Search of the
Public Interest, 3 J. INFO. L. & TECH. 15, § 4 (1997), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/. Similarly, “regulation of digital
broadcasting needs to be built on the objectives established for the analogue
world.” DAVID A. LEVY, EUROPE’S DIGITAL REVOLUTION, BROADCASTING
REGULATION, THE EU AND THE NATION STATE 109 (1999).
61. Feintuck, supra note 2, at 108.
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have been described as “missed opportunities for the
government to consider from first principles what can be
argued to be the real essence of media regulation: the task of
defending democratic and citizenship concerns.”62
The Act’s perception of the public as mainly comprising
economic actors leads us to question whether there is any room
left for citizenship rationales in the regulation of digital
television infrastructure. Although the Act acknowledges the
desire to preserve pluralism and diversity in the
communications sector, these arguments arise only in the
context of content regulation and do not affect the regulation of
The British
market structure or broadcaster behavior.63
government has made it clear that although these measures
are “highly deregulatory,” “broadcasting content will be
protected” “at every stage of deregulation.”64 The government
acknowledges the pluralism and diversity debate in relation to
content, but it ignores the “public policy” implications of
behavioral and structural regulation.
In order to ensure citizenship access to information, the
Act’s special provisions for public service broadcasters (PSBs)65
concentrate mainly on the imposition of “must carry”
obligations66 under section 64 of the Communication Act.67
62. Id.
63. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(2)(c) (Eng.).
64. Owen Gibson, Jowell Gets New Powers on Sky Carriage, THE
GUARDIAN,
Nov.
20,
2002,
available
at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4550610,00.html.
65. See Georgina Born, & Tony Prosser, Culture and Commercialism:
Citizenship, Public Service Broadcasting and the BBC’s Fair Trading
Obligations, 64 MOD. L. REV. 657, 661-64 (2001) (discussing the issue of
PSBs); Martin Cave, et. al., Regulating the BBC, 28 TELECOMM. POL’Y 249,
262 (2004).
66. See Marsden, supra note 4, at 23. “Must carry” obligations are
justified on the grounds that “there is a fundamental public interest in certain
channels being universally available.” OFTEL, THE PRICING OF CONDITIONAL
ACCESS SERVICES AND RELATED ISSUES: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ISSUED
BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 15 (May 8, 2002)
[hereinafter OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS], available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/
broadcasting/2002/cast0502.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
67. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 64(1) (Eng.). See OFTEL, THE
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF ENTITLEMENT, A CONSULTATION ISSUED BY THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ON THE DRAFT GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF ENTITLEMENT TO PROVIDE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 12 (May 22, 2002)
[hereinafter
OFTEL,
ENTITLEMENT],
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/licensing/
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Nevertheless, commercial pressures weakened the effectiveness
of these provisions. After strong lobbying from BSkyB, one of
the United Kingdom’s largest digital television platform
operators, the Act failed to impose “must carry” obligations on
satellite providers.68 This concession represents a departure
from the initial plan of applying must-carry obligations to all
delivery platforms.69 The measure has been justified on
grounds that the requirement of fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory access imposed on Conditional Access
providers is sufficient to assist PSBs in negotiations with
satellite platform operators.70 This mechanism may prove
insufficient, leaving PSBs in a vulnerable bargaining position,71
2002/enti0502.htm. (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). “‘[M]ust carry’ obligations, or
obligations requiring certain channels or programmes to be provided to the
public, may be imposed on broadcasting network operators where those
networks are the principal means for a significant number of end users to
receive radio and television.” Id.
68. See Marly Didizian & Jason Romer, The Communications Bill – The
Place of the BBC, 9 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 95, 98 (2003); Owen
Gibson, Davies Hits out over Satellite Coverage, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 25, 2002,
available
at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,847416,00.html.
Gibson
notes that “the culture secretary, Tessa Jowell, included a clause requiring the
BBC and other public service channels to be offered for broadcast across all
platforms, including satellite, and removed a clause included in the draft bill
requiring Sky to broadcast the channels.” Id.
69. The White Paper refers to the carriage of Public Service television
channels on all delivery platforms. See DTI – DCMS, A NEW FUTURE FOR
COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS WHITE PAPER 27. A similar approach
was adopted in the draft Bill. Cassels, supra note 5, at 92 (“[A] policy
statement issued with the draft Bill has indicated that the Government
believes that BSkyB should, after switchover, be required to carry the public
service channels at a cost.”). Must carry obligations were addressed in clause
49 of the draft Bill.
70. See Didizian & Romer, supra note 68, at 98-99. The conditions
applicable to the providers of Conditional Access services are contained in
Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 45 (Eng.).
71. “‘Must carry’ across all platforms is an essential quid pro quo for
imposing ‘must offer’ on PSBs. Without it, the ability of PSBs to negotiate
carriage on satellite at fair and reasonable terms will be severely
undermined.” Memorandum from Carlton Communications Plc, to House of
Commons, Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Minutes of
Evidence (Feb. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Memorandum], available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmcumeds/161/1
020808.
htm. “Must offer” obligations are contained in sections 272-273 of the
Communications Act and apply to “distribution over every appropriate
network.” Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 272 (Eng.). Prior to the Act,
PSBs were under no obligation to offer their services on any digital platform.
The only obligation applied in relation to analogue terrestrial. See OFTEL,
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because “what was fair and reasonable in relation to
broadcasters may not be sufficient in relation to PSBs with
universal reach obligations and which, therefore, cannot walk
away from negotiations if the terms offered are
unsatisfactory.”72 Furthermore, the position of public service
broadcasters is not aided by the fact that “fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory” access is not clearly defined in the Act.
Access to these services proves vital in ensuring a plurality
of market players in the communications sector.73 Access to
bottlenecks is also instrumental in ensuring citizens’ access to
information.
The imposition of “must carry” obligations
constitutes merely one tool for ensuring pluralism and diversity
in the communications sector.
Must-carry should be
accompanied by effective regulation of bottlenecks and
ownership.74 Unfortunately, current law fails to include a
public policy element in regulatory measures relating to digital
television infrastructure.75 Regulation must advance more
PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66, at 15.
72. Didizian & Romer, supra note 68, at 99. “[S]pecial consideration”
should be given to “the public service nature of a channel when setting prices
for access to the satellite.” Memorandum, supra note 71, § 4. In discussing
the price that is required from PSBs for Conditional Access services, Oftel
agreed that PSBs should pay a “commercially negotiated rate, . . . including a
contribution towards common costs.” OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL
ACCESS, supra note 66, at 13. This charge represents “both the incremental
cost of the provision of service and a reasonable contribution to common costs.”
OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66, at 13. Nevertheless,
PSBs are charged a lesser tariff for Conditional Access services than their
commercial counterparts. See generally Emily Bell, BBC Breaks Free from
Sky, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2003 (discussing the BBC’s decision to remove
its services from the BSkyB encryption system and broadcast from the Astra 2
satellite
covering
the
United
Kingdom),
available
at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/mediaguardian/ story/0,7558,915403,00.html. The
BBC will still pay BSkyB a sum “to develop a system that will allow viewers to
choose the correct regional version of the BBC’s TV channel.” Owen Gibson,
BBC and BSkyB Settle Satellite Dispute, THE GUARDIAN, June 13, 2003,
available
at
http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,977149,00.html.
73. “Without access to technology to enable this, it would be difficult for
broadcasters to take full advantage of digital television and radio, to the
detriment of choice for end users and to the detriment of variety and
innovation in the industry.” OFCOM, STATEMENT ON CODE ON ELECTRONIC
PROGRAMME GUIDES 4 (2004) [hereinafter OFCOM STATEMENT], available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/ condocs/epg/(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
74. Marsden, supra note 4, at 38.
75. See Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 412 (pointing towards the “existence
of certain public policy objectives – such as the preservation of pluralism and
consumer choice – which cannot be safeguarded solely by the application of
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than purely economic interests.
“If [the] argument for
regulation takes as its starting point the maximisation of
individual consumer choice, a second argument starts from the
need to promote a particular type of society with particular
forms of democratic procedures.”76
Apart from section 3, the Act refers to citizenship-related
interests only under the “duties for the purpose of fulfilling
Therefore, the citizenship
Community obligations.”77
dimension is accommodated under the wider context of
European Union law. The law of the European Union may be
better able to accommodate the democratic interests in the
regulation of the technical aspects of digital television.78 The
big media players can no longer be confined within strict
national boundaries. “[T]he synergistic strength of cross-media
empires” poses a “threat to democratic values.”79
The member states of the European Union appear
unwilling to give away too much power in relation to the
competition law.”). Interoperability and open standards need to be guaranteed
in order to ensure that the public is not tied to a particular technology. See
LEVY, supra note 60, at 149. Nevertheless, beside these concerns, it is
necessary to ensure that the interests of the public are given primacy over
commercial interests, and that the concept of the public is perceived as having
both consumer and citizenship elements.
76. Goldberg et al., supra note 27, at 301. Similarly, David Levy states:
“the arguments for the pure competition-based approach appear weak. The
fact that broadcasting regulation is subject to political intervention simply
reflects the political importance of this sector. The assumption that a simple
structural change – whereby broadcasting regulation would be transferred to a
competition authority – would reduce the incentive for such intervention, is a
naïve one.” LEVY, supra note 60, at 154.
77. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 4(5) (Eng.) In addition, according
to Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community:
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace
national citizenship.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty
and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 17, O.J. (C
325)
44
(2002),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/ 12002E_EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
78. I assume that within the current communications sector, we must
choose between either allowing unaccountable market players to make the
rules of the game and supporting a supranational response within a
democratic framework. See Jean K. Chalaby & Glen Segell, The Broadcasting
Media in the Age of Risk. The Advent of Digital Television, 1 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 351, 355-57 (1999).
79. Feintuck, supra note 2, at 122.
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communications sector. Given questions of competence and
subsidiarity, it is perhaps inevitable that the Union should
have a limited degree of influence over matters which, being
more or less related to culture, are regarded as the proper
concern of the member states.80 Both the 2002 Directives and
the Act illustrate that the regulation of the digital revolution
still has a significant national dimension. Nevertheless, the
Act specifies certain duties in the context of fulfilling
community obligations, including the requirement to
“contribute to the development of the European internal
market.”81
The growth of media empires beyond national borders
poses significant challenges to national control of their power.82
Unfortunately, it often seems that market forces shape
regulation, rather than regulation shaping the market: “In the
process of regulating any industry, the companies which are
regulated will have an interest in influencing the decisions of
the regulators and will spend a substantial amount of time and

80. See id. at 111.
81. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 4(4) (Eng.) Other obligations
imposed for “fulfilling Community obligations” include the duty to “promote
competition” in section 4(3), to safeguard the interest of European citizens in
section 4(5), to encourage network access, and to interoperability in section
4(7) and ensure compliance with standards in section 4(9). Communications
Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 4(3), 4(5), 4(7), 4(9) (Eng.). These duties need to be
interpreted in accordance with article 8(2) of the Directive 2002/21/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council:
The national regulatory authorities shall promote competition in the
provision of electronic communications networks, electronic
communications services and associated facilities and services by
inter alia: (a) ensuring that users, including disabled users, derive
maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality; (b) ensuring
that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the
electronic communications sector; (c) encouraging efficient investment
in infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and (d) encouraging
efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio
frequencies and numbering resources.
Framework Directive, supra note 17, at art. 8(2), 2002 O.J. (L 108) at 42.
82. “[T]he crucial topic of regulation is the problem of use and abuse of
power.” LEVY, supra note 60, at 145. The need to control this power of the
market is entrenched on the influential role by the media in society. As David
Levy states,
[T]he true rationale of broadcasting regulation lies in the uniquely
influential role of a medium which helps form public opinion, provides
a forum for public debate and discussion, and - in places where
regulation has not intervened to prevent it - offers a unique source of
commercial and political power for private media owners.
Id. at 144.
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money trying to influence their decisions.”83 The power shift
from the public sphere into private hands has increased the
vulnerability of the public to commercial manipulation. Only
the European Union stands a fair chance of effectively
controlling the power of big market players and of setting a
framework for ensuring the protection of citizenship-related
Once the “public policy” dimension of the
interests.84
bottlenecks challenge is acknowledged at the European Union
level, a similar sensitivity to democratic concerns will be
reflected in the policies adopted at the level of the member
states. Unfortunately, these interests are not adequately
reflected in the 2002 Directives or the Act. So far, instead of
ensuring the best deal for the public, the regulatory approach
reveals a tendency toward guaranteeing the best deal for big
market players. The same words Anthony Varona used to
describe American communications law, can be used in the
European context to argue that “economic and marketplace
demands” have transformed the protection of public interest
considerations in the communications sector into a “commercial
impossibility.”85
II. THE BEST DEAL FOR CONSUMERS?
This section aims to demonstrate that while the
Communications Act failed to acknowledge the “public policy”
dimension of regulating digital television infrastructure, it
filled most of the gaps in the economic regulation of
bottlenecks. However, it remains to be questioned whether the
economic regulation of DTV infrastructure has genuinely
advanced the interest of consumers in mind.
83. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 87. Similarly, Lawrence Tshuma argues,
“[s]ome of the private sector networks raise fundamental issues regarding
democratic accountability . . . . Without co-ordination, issues falling within the
regulatory grey zone between networks are likely to escape effective
regulation.” Lawrence Tshuma, Hierarchies and Government Versus Networks
and Governance: Competing Regulatory Paradigms in Global Economic
Regulation, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 115, 136-37 (2000). Anthony Varona
reaches a similar conclusion in relation to the United States: “[T]here is little
doubt that the FCC has been ‘captured’ by the broadcast industry.” Varona,
supra note 1, at 82.
84. See generally Alison Harcourt, Engineering Europeanization: The Role
of the European Institutions in Shaping National Media Regulation, 9 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 736 (2002) (discussing Europeanization with different policy
instruments and intersecting agendas in the regulation of the communications
sector).
85. Varona, supra note 1, at 9.
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The regulation of digital television infrastructure suffered
from the flawed implementation of the 1995 Advanced
Television Standards (ATS) Directive.86 Regulation under the
Communications Act was therefore necessary to address issues
of access to services and networks. “[U]nless service providers
can get easy access through networks and gateways, and
consumers can receive the greatest possible range of services
through a single delivery system, there is a very real risk that
huge possibilities offered by convergence will not be realised.”87
Prior to recent regulatory instruments at both the
European88 and the British level,89 critics emphasized the need
for “a common framework for the regulation of gateways which
control access over telecommunications networks.”90 The ATS
Directive failed to cover interactive services offered via the Set
Top Box (STB).91 The Directive also failed to define the terms
“digital television services” and “broadcasters.”92 The European
86. The British system for regulating CASs was based on the conditional
access services class license, which stems from the Advanced Television
Services Regulations, 1996 and the Advanced Television Services
(Amendment) Regulations 1996, which in turn implemented the Advanced
Television Standards Directive (Directive 95/47/EC as repealed by Directive
2002/21/EC). See OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS: OFTEL
GUIDELINES 4 (Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY], available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/broadcasting/
2002/cagu1002.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
87. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, at § 1B(2).
88. See Access Directive, supra note 17; Authorisation Directive, supra
note 17; Framework Directive, supra note 17; Universal Service Directive,
supra note 17.
89. The Communications Act 2003 received royal assent on July 17, 2003.
Press Notice, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, The Communications
(Jul.
7,
2003),
at
Bill
Gets
Royal
Assent
http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/press_notices/default.htm (last visited Apr.
19, 2005).
90. OFTEL, RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S WORKING
DOCUMENT SUMMARISING THE RESULTS OF THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON
THE GREEN PAPER ON CONVERGENCE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECTORS Annex A (Nov., 1998) [hereinafter
OFTEL,
RESPONSE],
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/1995_98/broadcasting
/ eu1198.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
91. Id.
92. OFTEL, DIGITAL TELEVISION AND INTERACTIVE SERVICES: ENSURING
ACCESS ON FAIR, REASONABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TERMS § 3.11 (Mar.,
DIGITAL],
available
at
1998)
[hereinafter
OFTEL,
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/
oftel/publications/1995_98/broadcasting/dig398.htm. (last visited Apr. 19,
2005).
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Union’s 2002 Directives are designed to expand the regulation
of networks and gateways in digital television. For example,
the Access and Interconnection Directive adopts a “horizontal
approach” in regulating electronic communication networks
and services, representing “a move from the sectoral
organization of the regulation of infrastructure.”93 The new
measures for regulating the communications sector provide a
coordinated response to the challenges posed by convergence.94
These measures are designed to be technology-neutral: “[they]
will cover all types of networks and services, hence the change
in
terminology
from
‘telecommunications’
to
‘communications.’”95 Under the current measures, providers
are classified as “providers of electronic communications
networks,”
“electronic
communications
services,”
and
“associated facilities.”96 These regulations’ enhanced scope may
lead to the regulation of previously unregulated networks and
services, particularly in new technology areas.”97
Initially, British law remedied this problem by adopting
regulatory measures covering “access control services.” Under
this approach, Oftel98 avoided the tying of regulation to a
particular technology by promoting “regulations based on the
commercial process rather than on the technical definition of
services.”99 The Act, by its adoption of measures designed to

93. Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411.
94. OFTEL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) BY INTERNET
PROVIDERS ABOUT THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, Version 1:0 3 (Mar.
24,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/is
pfaq0303.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
95. Simon Taylor, The EU Electronic Communications Package:
Competition-Based Regulation for the Digital Age, 12 UTIL. L. REV. 83, 83
(2002).
96. For a more detailed discussion see OFTEL, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, supra note 94, at 3.
97. Taylor, supra note 95, at 83.
98. The duties of Oftel have been taken over by OFCOM starting
December
29,
2003.
See
http://www.itc.org.uk/divisions/econ_div/epg_code.asp?section (last visited
Mar. 4, 2005).
99. OFTEL, RESPONSE, supra note 90, Annex A. In relation to the
undefined notion of “television services” in the ATS Directive, Oftel states that
these terms must not be addressed “in an unduly restrictive way.” OFTEL,
THE REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR DIGITAL TELEVISION SERVICES
¶
A6,
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/ind_info/broadcasting/conacc.htm
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
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regulate electronic communications networks, services, and
associated facilities, illustrates the need for generic rules.100
Therefore, the issue of access must be perceived from a crosssectoral perspective: “a consistent set of regulatory rules and
principles should apply to any proprietary technological devices
which may be used to restrict access, irrespective of the types of
services carried via them.”101 The Act advances a “new
framework for the regulation of electronic communication
services and services.”102 This framework covers, inter alia,
“TV-based digital interactive services and associated
networks,”103 reflecting a “move towards a more horizontal
approach” to the issue of access.104
The ATS Directive was characterized by an overemphasis
on the regulation of Conditional Access Systems (CASs) at the
expense of other bottlenecks in digital television, such as
electronic program guides (EPGs)105 and application program
interfaces (APIs).106 Critics demanded an extension of the
In its
access-related conditions to include receivers.107
interpretation of the access requirements for Conditional
Access Systems (CASs), Oftel included receivers, based on the
view that “[t]here is clearly limited value in regulating access
to [CASs] . . . if this is negated by control of other gateways.
100. OFTEL, RESPONSE, supra note 90, at § 1.3.
101. Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411.
102. Communications Act, 2003, c.21, Explanatory Notes, § 5 (Eng.),
available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2003/2003en21.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005). The Puttnam Report notes: “[G]iven the key
importance of access-related conditions to the future of regulation, the
provisions of the draft Bill provide a new unified framework for such
regulation have attracted surprisingly little comment.” Puttnam Report,
supra note 12, at 45.
103. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 88.
104. Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411.
105. These allow television viewers to search for available programs. See,
e.g., ETVCookbook: ETV Glossary (revised Mar. 25, 2003), at
http://etvcookbook.org/glossary/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
106. API is “a set of programming tools that pre-define functions and
routines affording convenience to developers by grouping common
programming material into blocks.” Id.
107. EPGs and APIs are classified as receivers in the DTV supply chain.
See Martin Cave & Campbell Cowie, Not only Conditional Access. Towards a
Better Regulatory Approach to Digital TV (Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with author).
For a discussion of the call for extending the scope of access conditions to
include these bottlenecks see Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411. Nikos
Nikolinakos identifies the need for regulating “all existing and potential
gateway technologies” as well as for “provid[ing] a broader framework for
access both to networks and gateways”. Id.
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This has enabled the UK to take a broad interpretation of
technical services. . . .”108 Oftel regulated EPGs “in so far as
their provision is a provision for a Conditional Access
Service.”109 The regulator was concerned with ensuring that
these services reflect mainly the needs of the consumers and
that competition is not restricted, prevented, or distorted.110
By going beyond what was required in the ATS Directive, Oftel
“created Europe’s most detailed regulatory framework for
[CASs], and (together with the broadcasting regulator, the
[ITC]) what was at that time the only set of guidelines
anywhere in Europe on the operation of [EPGs].”111
The approach adopted in the 2002 Directives on electronic
communications includes APIs and EPGs “if justified,” leaving
the member states a strong voice in such matters.112 Prior to
the publication of the Directive, it was stated that “[i]t is too
early in the development of digital interactive services market
to determine whether regulatory intervention in the supply of
The European Union
APIs and EPGs is required.”113
emphasized that before the imposition of such requirements, it
is necessary to encourage market players to adopt open
standards.114
The Communications Act refers specifically to the

108. OFTEL, RESPONSE, supra note 90, Annex A.
109. Oftel classifies EPGs as part of CASs “in so far as [they] control[]
access by viewers to television services.”
Commission Decision of 15
September 1999 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty,
1999
O.J.
(L
312)
8,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexdoc!prod!CELEXnum
doc&lg=EN&numdoc=31999D0781&model=lex.
110. OFTEL, ITC CODE OF CONDUCT ON ELECTRONIC PROGRAMME GUIDES
¶
3
(1997),
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/itc_publications/
codes_guidance/electronic_programme_guide/epg_code.asp.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2005).
111. LEVY, supra note 60, at 100; see also OVUM, STUDY ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACCESS
NETWORKS AND SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
INFORMATION SOCIETY DIRECTORATE, ON THE REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL
ACCESS SYSTEMS AND RELATED FACILITIES 4 fig.1.1 n.1 (2001) [hereinafter
OVUM] (“The market for CAS may be defined to include associated facilities
such as API and EPG, and/or to include access control systems for broadband
interactive services.”).
112. OVUM, supra note 111, at 3; see also Framework Directive, supra note
17, at recital 18, 2002 O.J. (L. 108) at 35.
113. OVUM, supra note 111, at 3.
114. Id.

VARNEY_FINAL_4-24-05

2005]

11/07/2006 18:43:59

WINNERS AND LOSERS

667

EPGs are classified,
regulation of APIs115 and EPGs.116
alongside CASs, as “associated facilities.”117 Nevertheless,
under the new measures, EPGs are regulated separately and
not as part of the CASs, as was the approach prior to the Act.118
In regulating receivers, OFCOM may impose obligations on the
controllers of these technologies, in order to ensure
(a) that persons are able to have access to such programme services
provided in digital form, as OFCOM may determine; and (b) that the
facility for using those interfaces or guides is provided on terms
which- (i) are fair and reasonable; and (ii) do not involve, or tend to
give rise to any undue discrimination against any person or
description of persons.119

Therefore, the Act extends the requirement of “fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory” access to EPGs and APIs, going
further than what is required in the 2002 European
Directives.120
115. The API is defined in the Communications Act 2003 as “a facility for
allowing software to make use, in connection with any of the matters
mentioned in subsection (4), of facilities contained in other software.”
Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 74(3) (Eng.). The matters discussed in
subsection 4 include:
(a) allowing a person to have access to programme services; (b)
allowing a person, other than a communications provider or a person
who makes associated facilities available, to make use of an electronic
communications network by means of which a programme service is
broadcast or otherwise transmitted; (c) allowing a person to become
the end-user of a description of public electronic communications
service.
Id. § 74(4).
116. Section 74(3) of the Act defines an EPG as:
a facility by means of which a person has access to any service which
consists of: (a) the listing or promotion, or both the listing and the
promotion, of some or all of the programmes included in any one or
more programme services; and (b) a facility for obtaining access, in
whole or in part, to the programme service or services listed or
promoted in the guide.
Id. § 74(3).
117. See id. § 32(3) (defining associated facilities). The explanatory notes
refer to “a facility which is available for use[,] in association with an electronic
communications network or service[,] in order to make the provision of that
network or service (or other services) possible, or to support the provision of
other services.” Id. at explanatory notes § 87.
118. In July 2003, Oftel noted that “EPG services are subject to their own
conditions under the continuation notice regime and will be also when the new
regulations are in place.” OFTEL, THE REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS:
SETTING REGULATORY CONDITIONS 7 (July 24, 2003), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/
publications/date_order/2003_pubs.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
119. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 74(2) (Eng.).
120. See Framework Directive, supra note 17, at recital 30, 2002 O.J. (L
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In July 2004, OFCOM issued a code of practice for EPG
providers.121 This instrument is based on sections 310 and 311
of the Communications Act122 and requires EPG operators to
enable the use of these facilities by people with hearing or
visual impairments and to give appropriate prominence to
PSBs in the EPG listings.123 The Code is also concerned with
ensuring “fair and effective competition”124 and calls for any
agreements between EPG providers and broadcasters to be
conducted on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms.”125 However, critics point out that in reality, the Code
places more emphasis on “non-discrimination” and is concerned
to a lesser extent with ensuring “fair and reasonable”
treatment.126 The BBC expresses disappointment that under
the current framework, the EPG operator unilaterally decides
the “architecture” of the EPGs. For example, the categories
under which channels are listed are often designed to suit “in
house” services, while discriminating against mixed-genre
public service channels.127 Yet, OFCOM rejected calls for
intervening in the manner in which EPG operators exercise
their power128 by arguing that “it would [not] be appropriate for
O[FCOM] to prescribe what these policies should be, since this
would constrain the approaches that EPG providers could
108) at 37; Access Directive, supra note 17, at recital 10, 2002 O.J. (L 108) at
8.
121. See OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73. The adoption of the Code
was preceded by a consultation process launched in January 2004. See Press
Release, OFCOM, The Regulation of Electronic Programme Guides (Jan. 16,
2004), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media_office/news_archive/
nr1_20040116 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
122. According to § 310 of the Communications Act, “[i]t shall be the duty
of OFCOM to draw up, and from time to time to review and revise, a code
giving guidance as to the practices to be followed in the provision of electronic
programme guides.” Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 § 310(1) (Eng). See
discussion in Crane & Calleja, supra note 19, at 116-21.
123. See OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 6.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 8.
126. See BRITISH BROAD. CORP., CONSULTATION ON THE REGULATION OF
ELECTRONIC PROGRAMME GUIDES. THE BBC RESPONSE ¶ 7 (2004) [hereinafter
CONSULTATION],
available
at
BBC
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/responses/epc/ responses/bbc.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2005).
127. Id. ¶ 8.
128. As argued by the BBC, “without a willingness on Ofcom’s part to
monitor how vertically-integrated EPG operators exercise their control of
those gateways, then that control may be exercised in a manner which
mitigates against fair and effective competition.” Id. ¶ 11.
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adopt.”129
Furthermore, although the Code requires that “appropriate
prominence” be given to public service channels, OFCOM
refrains from providing any further guidance as to the meaning
of these terms. In the comments to the draft Code, the BBC
invoked Parliament’s intent that public service broadcasters be
given “greater prominence” in the EPG listings than their
commercial counterparts.130 The amendments to the draft
Code on this issue are limited to a mere request that the EPG
operators publish a statement on how they will comply with the
requirement for appropriate prominence.131 This provision fails
to respond to the BBC’s concerns that “the interpretation of
Parliament’s intent” has been left to EPG providers.132
In relation to access provisions for CASs,133 the Act states
that it is the duty of OFCOM to ensure that access-related
conditions134
(a) [a]re applied to every person who provides a conditional access
system in relation to a protected programme service; and (b) that
those conditions make all such provision as is required by [virtue of]
Part I of Annex I to the Access Directive (conditions relating to access
to digital [television and radio] services.135

The issue of access to networks can be approached from a
technological and a competitive perspective. The technological
approach refers, inter alia, to issues of access, interoperability,
and standardization.136 On the other hand, the competitionbased approach refers to the requirement of ensuring access on
a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis.”137 Sections
45138 and 73 to 76 of the Act allow OFCOM to impose access129. OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 20.
130. BBC CONSULTATION, supra note 126, ¶ 6.
131. OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 6.
132. BBC CONSULTATION, supra note 126, ¶ 6.
133. A CAS is defined in § 75(3) of the Communications Act as: “any
system, facility, arrangements or technical measure under or by means of
which access to programme services requires: (a) a subscription to the service
or to a service that includes that service; or (b) an authorisation to view it, or
to listen to it, on a particular occasion.” Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 §
75(3) (Eng.).
134. See id. § 73(2) (describing access related conditions).
135. Id. § 75(2); see also id. § 47(2) (referring to the tests for setting or
modifying conditions).
136. Specific reference is made to the need for SMP operators to comply
with international standards. Id. § 75(1).
137. Id. § 74(2).
138. Under section 45, OFCOM has the power to set general conditions
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related conditions,139 applicable especially to networks or
associated facilities providers that control access to networks
by other market players.140 Further conditions concerning
network access are contained in section 87 of the Act.141 These
conditions are necessary in order to impose a form of control on
providers of network services, once they are no longer subjected
to
the
obligations
of
an
individual
license
for
telecommunication systems: “[T]hese licence conditions will be
replaced by a combination of general conditions applicable to
all communications providers (or all communication providers
of a particular type) and specific conditions to be set and
The
applied to individual communications providers.”142
conditions concerning Conditional Access providers may be
applied irrespective of the degree of market power.143 This is
(sections 45(3), 51, 52, 57, 58 and 64), universal service conditions (sections
45(4) and 67), access related conditions (sections 45(6) and 77), and SMP
conditions (sections 45(7) and 87-92). Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 (Eng.).
For an analysis of these conditions, see Nick Pimlott, Future Regulation of the
Communications Industry Still in the Balance, 8 TOLLEY’S COMM. L. 247
(2003). General conditions can be imposed on anyone who provides electronic
communications networks and services. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 §
46(2) (Eng.). Access-related conditions can be imposed on any person who
“control[s] network access” or “provides an electronic communications
network, or makes associated facilities available.” Id. §§ 74(1), 46(6). Accessrelated conditions are not imposed solely on providers having SMP. Pimlott
notes that “the intended scope [of these conditions] is not clear” and that
“seizing this uncertainty, the [Act] takes the broadest possible approach.”
Pimlott, supra, at 247.
139. Based on Annex I, Access Directive implemented by section 45 of the
Communications Act, the domestic regulator drafted major conditions on the
issue of access, referring, inter alia, to the provision of access on fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.
See OFTEL, THE FUTURE
REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS: A CONSULTATION ISSUED BY THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 14 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter
OFTEL,
FUTURE
REGULATION],
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/ca
0603.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
Further conditions refer to
“transcontrol,” obligation “to keep separate financial accounts,” and
“publication of charges, terms and conditions.” Id. at 14-16.
140. See Puttnam Report, supra note 12, at 45. In October 2002, Oftel put
forth the revised set of access guidelines for CA services. See OFTEL, TERMS
OF SUPPLY, supra note 86.
141. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 § 74 (Eng.).
142. See OFTEL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 94, ¶ 1.4.
143. OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 139, at 10; see also OFTEL,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) BY SERVICE PROVIDERS ABOUT THE
NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Version 2, at 9 (Mar. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
OFTEL,
SERVICE
PROVIDERS],
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/

VARNEY_FINAL_4-24-05

2005]

11/07/2006 18:43:59

WINNERS AND LOSERS

671

justified on the basis that “market power” is not necessarily the
sole basis for ex ante regulation.144 Access to CASs is crucial in
ensuring “choice to the end users” and a plurality of
competitors in the communications market.145 Nevertheless,
based on recital 6 of the Access Directive, national regulators
can remove these conditions from operators that do not possess
Significant Market Power (SMP).146
Control of a gateway presumes a position of dominance,
calling for market power determination and market definition
according to European Union guidelines. Determination of
SMP is based on an assessment of dominance147 in the relevant
market.148 The guidelines refer to the ability of an undertaking
to act independently of competitors and consumers.149 The
guidelines also consider the exercising of joint dominance150
and the increase of power within a market due to a dominant
position in a “closely related market.”151
The issue of market definition poses particular concerns for
the communications sector.152 OFCOM’s approach to market
eu_directives/2003/spfaq0503.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
144. See OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 139, at 10 (stating that
“competition rules alone may not be sufficient to ensure cultural diversity and
media pluralism in the area of digital television” (citation omitted)).
145. See id. at 14 (explaining conditions).
146. See id. at 11; see also Communications Act, 2003, c.21, §§ 45(5), 73
(Eng.); OFTEL, SERVICE PROVIDERS, supra note 143, at 9 (noting the rationale
of recital 6 Access Directive, pointing out that “there may be large differences
in negotiating power between providers and . . . some providers depend on
infrastructure provided by other providers to deliver their services,” and
calling for “proportionate access obligations on providers that control access to
end-users”).
147. See OFTEL, DIGITAL, supra note 92, § 3.1 (noting that examples of
abuse of a dominant position by bottlenecks controllers include “exploitative
pricing for use of the gateway or behaviour leading to the distortion,
restriction or prevention of competition in a related market”).
148. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 78(1) (Eng.) (“[A] person shall
be taken to have significant market power in relation to a market if he enjoys
a position which amounts to or is equivalent to dominance of the market.”).
149. See id. § 78(3); see also Case C-27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm’n,
1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 83 (1978).
150. See Communications Act, 2003, ch. 21, § 78(3) (Eng.) (“A person is to
be taken to enjoy a position of dominance of a market if he is one of a number
of persons who enjoy such a position in combination with each other.”).
151. See id. § 78(4); see also Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n,
1996 E.C.R. I-5951.
152. See E. Jane Carter, Market Definition in the Broadcasting Sector, 24
WORLD COMPETITION 93, 93 (2001); see also Communications Act, 2003, c.21, §
79 (Eng.) (addressing the issue of market definition).
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definition is based on European guidelines.
The 2002
Directives allow the European Commission to veto market
definitions adopted by member states:
A particularly controversial feature of the EU regime is the power
granted to the European Commission to block NRA [national
regulatory authority] decisions on market definition or the
designating of operators with SMP [significant marker power], where
these would damage the internal market or infringe Community Law.
The [Act] should therefore be read in this context.153

The European Union plays a prominent role in setting the
framework to be followed within member states. In the
regulation of digital television gateways, all the member states
are confronted with common problems. The Union represents
the most appropriate level for addressing these issues,
illustrating the need for the supranational coordination in the
regulation of bottlenecks.
Under the Act, OFCOM may impose on enterprises
possessing SMP conditions related to access to networks and
associated facilities.154 This power affects providers of public
electronic communication networks and controllers of
associated facilities.155 Special consideration is given to viable
alternatives,156 the “feasibility” of providing network access, the
investment made by the network/facility controller,157 the longterm effect that the imposition or the failure to impose accessrelated conditions may have on competition, intellectual
property rights,158 and the necessity of ensuring the provision
153. Crane & Calleja, supra note 19, at 117.
154. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 87(3) (Eng.); see also Mike
Feintuck, The UK Broadcasting Act 1996: A Holding Operation?, 3 EUROPEAN
PUB. L. 201, 212 (1997) (arguing that the 1996 Broadcasting Act “fail[ed],
significantly, to integrate fully consideration of control of gateways into the
general control of cross-media holdings”).
155. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 87(2) (Eng.).
156. See Case C-7/79, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, 4
C.M.L.R. 112 (1999).
157. See Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 410 (expressing the concern that the
TV Standards Directive may discourage innovation); see also OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING, E-COMMERCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION POLICY 2
(Aug. 2000) (noting that network effects “occur where a system becomes more
useful to its participants, the more participants it has”), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/nr/rdonlyres/c58cf2cf-8e9d-496a-b9898ff1be9de863/0/oft308.pdf; Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization, and
Network Effects: Some Policy Implications, 18 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 80,
80 (2002) (discussing network effects).
158. See Frank Wooldridge, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Magill II:
the Decision of the ECJ in Oscar Bronner, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 256, 261 (1999)
(discussing the decision in Magill II regarding the essential facilities doctrine
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of electronic communications services.159 This latter point may
be related to the “public policy” implications of bottlenecks
regulation and the need to ensure pluralism and diversity in
the communications sector. The Act reforms the definition of
SMP, adopting an interpretation based on the competitive
concept of dominance:160
SMP conditions will be imposed on communications providers that
make available associated facilities, where they are found to have a
dominant position on the market. These conditions will include
access to dominant networks, controls on pricing or charges for such
access, provision of carrier pre-select facilities, retail price controls,
and provision of leased lines.161

Commentators have identified the “tension” that may be
triggered by the adoption of the same SMP test for both
regulation and competition issues, as “the latter is dynamic and
evolves, whereas the former is designed to establish more
predictable rule framework on which investment decisions may
be based.”162 Instead of creating flexibility, the new measures
will lead to uncertainty.163
Regarding the imposition of competition-related conditions,
the 1995 ATS Directive required the imposition of access on a
“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis,” without
defining these terms:164 “the task of defining ‘fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory’ has provided to be an arduous one,
especially in a context in which conditional access services are
employed not only for a variety of entertainment services but

and copyright law).
159. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 87(4) (Eng.) (listing the factors
OFCOM must take into account when determining what conditions should be
set in a particular case).
160. Taylor, supra note 95, at 89 (“The introduction of a significant market
power threshold based on the competition law concept of dominance will also
avoid the inconsistency between EC competition law and regulation, which is
a feature of the current rules.”).
161. Crane & Calleja, supra note 19, at 117; see generally OFTEL, PRICING
OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66 (containing consultations on the issue
of price control); OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 3.
162. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 87.
163. See id.
164. See OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66, at 9
(giving Oftel’s interpretation of these terms); see also Press Release, Oftel,
Oftel Confirms Conditional Access Policy: Oftel Publishes Decision on ITV
Complaint
(Oct.
22,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/press/releases/2002/ pr61_02.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
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also in the provision of interactive services.”165
The Act’s requirement for providing access on a fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory basis reflects the same
wording and the same ambiguity as the 2002 Directives.166
Within the United Kingdom, reliance has been placed on Oftel’s
guidelines for defining these standards.
The fair and
reasonable requirement has been interpreted as referring to
the avoidance of “unreasonable charges.”167 Oftel assesses
whether access is conferred on terms that are “consistent” with
what would be reasonably expected in a competitive market.168
Concerning the “non-discriminatory” requirement, Oftel
addresses, inter alia, whether the conditions for granting access
would lead to a “material adverse effect on competition.”169
These conditions have particular relevance for the regulation of
vertically integrated operators.170 Nevertheless, Oftel observes
that the requirement for “non-discriminatory access” should not
be interpreted as meaning “no differentiation at all.”171
Differences in the provision of Conditional Access services are
acceptable, as long as they are “objectively justifiable, for
example, by differences in the underlying costs of supplying
services to different undertakings.”172
The guidelines will generally be followed by the Director
General of Telecommunications. Nevertheless, “the Director
General cannot legally fetter his discretion in advance, and
therefore he retains the ability to depart from the guidelines
where the circumstances warrant it.” 173 As a result, these
165. Cave & Cowie, supra note 107.
166. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, §§ 74(2), 87(5)(a) (Eng.); see also
id. § 87(6)(a) (referring to nondiscrimination in the provision of access to
networks and facilities); id. § 87(6)(b)-(e) (referring to the transparency
requirement that facility controllers must honor in setting the terms and
conditions for access to networks and facilities).
167. Cave & Cowie, supra note 107.
168. See OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 7.
169. Id. at 3 (stating that “comparable prices should be offered to
comparable users, for comparable services, at comparable terms”).
170. See id. at 8 (“[A]n important aim of a non-discriminatory condition is
to ensure that a vertically integrated supplier does not treat itself in way that
benefits itself . . . in such a way as to have a material effect on competition.”);
see also id. at 6 (asserting that in assessing pricing matters, Oftel intervenes
only if the negotiation between undertakings fails to reach a “fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory” result).
171. OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 139, at 16.
172. Id.
173. OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 5; see also KENNETH
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provisions do not have binding force: “These guidelines
represent Oftel’s current view on the way it would interpret its
responsibilities and exercise its discretion under current
legislation. They do not form part of the current statutory
provisions and so do not affect the scope of the legislation.”174
The failure of the European Union to define what constitutes
“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” access has passed
this task on to the member states. Individual states have made
divergent interpretations of these provisions, moving further
away from harmonization in the approach for regulating
bottlenecks controllers. In the United Kingdom, more certainty
would have been provided by an explicit definition in the Act
regarding standards for the provision of “fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory access.”
Prior to the 2002 regulatory measures, one significant
criticism of the United Kingdom’s regulatory approach to
bottlenecks was the lack of adequate measures to address the
issue of interoperability. For example, the BBC noted that the
Advanced Television Standards Directive should be updated to
include “interoperability between [CASs], including the API
and the EPG, . . . either through use of common and open
standards, or that where proprietary standards are used, key
standards and interfaces are declared and publicly available on
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.”175
Effective access to networks can be guaranteed only by
ensuring open standards or interoperability176 between
proprietary technology, as the telecommunications market has
Open access provisions refer to the
demonstrated.177
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 26 (University
of Illinois Press, 1971) (noting that administrative discretion must be confined,
structured, and checked).
174. OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 5.
175. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, at §§ 1B(3), (4). The research deals
with interoperability between technical specifications in order to avoid
bottlenecks.
176. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 151 (Eng.) (defining “service
interoperability”
as
“interoperability
between
different
electronic
communications services”).
177. See BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, § 1(A)1 (“The successful
development of a comparative market . . . has developed on a distribution
spine on all users, published standards, [and] an interconnect regime.”); see
also Taylor, supra note 95, at 87.
In order for an interactive service provider . . . to ensure that its
content is displayed and accessed on the TV in the manner intended
(and selected by the user via the EPG (Electronic Programme
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requirement of “[making] facilities and/or services available to
another undertaking, on regulated terms, for the purpose of
The 2002 Oftel
providing communications services.”178
guidelines on open access impose, inter alia, obligations on
undertakings possessing significant market power “to offer
access to their encryption systems to third-party broadcasters,
thereby allowing those broadcasters to supply their TV
Similarly, the issue of
channels to consumers.”179
interoperability proves essential to avoiding establishing
bottlenecks in the DTV supply chain:
The
lack
of
interoperable
and
open
standards
for
components/software in the set top box creates gateway issues.
Without interoperability between platforms, once a consumer has
bought the hardware required to receive digital television, they are
tied into that particular platform, facing a considerable capital outlay
to switch to an alternative.180

Competing CASs and receivers maintain the existence of
bottlenecks in the DTV supply chain:181 “This could make it
costly . . . for interactive retailers on one platform to replicate
their home shopping service on another because they would
need to rewrite their own APIs to match those of the second
platform.”182 The 2002 Directives and the Communications Act
encourage the adoption of voluntary standards by the
Guide)[)], its own API must be compatible with the API built in the
middleware (operating system) and hardware (set top box) used by
the interactive services platform).
Id.
178. OFTEL, OPEN ACCESS: DELIVERING EFFECTIVE COMPETITION IN
COMMUNICATION
MARKETS
2
(Apr.
2001),
available
at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/
static/archive/oftel/publications/broadcasting/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19,
2005).
179. Id. at 2; see also OFTEL, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 67, at 7.
180. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, § 1(B)(1).
181. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 88 (“[B]arriers to competition could still
arise in member states (such as the United Kingdom), where competing digital
platforms use different conditional access systems and various API
standards.”); see also Feintuck, supra note 154, at 206. The preference for
standards developed by the industry was also manifested in relation to the
1996 Broadcasting Act. Feintuck notes that:
Conspicuous by their absence from the primary legislation on
broadcasting are detailed measures concerning . . . the control of
conditional access systems (CASs) or receiver decoding equipment.
This, states Gibbons, reflects the Government’s wish not to intervene
in market activity which will itself, in time, result in the emergence of
an industry standard).
Id.
182. Taylor, supra note 95, at 88.
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industry.183 Furthermore, the 2004 review conducted by the
Commission concluded that for the time being, there is no
compelling need for mandatory standards.184 This preference
for the voluntary adoption of standards is based on the view
that “[to] ‘encourage’ rather than ‘mandate’ the open API,
provide[s] for appropriate remuneration to be paid for the
information required to ensure interoperability with
proprietary APIs.”185 Nevertheless, this approach is unlikely to
succeed, as vertically integrated players have an interest in the
maintenance of proprietary standards.186 “[U]nder these
circumstances, requirements for open access cannot sensibly be
left to self regulation. Instead, regulation is required to
establish open access principles in advance of the development
In maintaining proprietary
of services or technology.”187
standards, bottlenecks controllers ensure, among other things,
that consumers are tied to their services. As market players
have “too much at stake” in the preservation of these
proprietary standards, regulators will likely have to resort to
the imposition of standards.188 Such an approach would be
justified on the basis of safeguarding interoperability and
freedom of choice189 and would acknowledge that besides the
economic
dimension,
issues
of
standardization
and
interoperability also implicate public policy favoring plurality
and diversity.
Until then, however, Anthony Varona’s
183. See OFTEL, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 67, at 7 (noting that the issue of
standardization is addressed in Art. 17, Framework Directive and conditions 3
and 18, Annex A, Authorisation Directive); see also Communications Act,
2003, c.21, §§ 4(9), 4(10), 51(1)(g) (Eng.) (discussing standards); Taylor, supra
note 95, at 87 (noting that “[a]nother agreed change to the Framework
Directive is designed to promote the free flow of information, cultural diversity
and media pluralism by encouraging the adoption of an open [API]” and
characterizing an open API as “conform[ing] to a standard or specification
adopted by the European standards organisations”).
184. See Communication from the European Commission of the European
Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on Interoperability of Digital Interactive Television
Services, SEC (2002) 1028 (July 30, 2004) (recommending further review in
2005).
185. Taylor, supra note 95, at 88.
186. See Gandal, supra note 157, at 84.
187. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, § 1(A)3.
188. See id.; LEVY, supra note 60, at 64 (arguing that “the very existence of
such proprietary systems increases the risk that their operators might abuse
their positions as gatekeepers”).
189. See Taylor, supra note 95 at 88.
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assessment of a regulatory framework in which the market
players make the rules of the game will continue to apply to the
United Kingdom: “[I]t is not surprising that the broadcast lobby
has become one of the most obvious ‘textbook’ examples of an
industry ‘capturing’ its regulators.”190
CONCLUSION: “HISTORY IS WRITTEN BY THE
WINNERS”191
Communications markets are not in fact shaped by
regulation.
Rather, regulation seems to be shaped by
commercial interests at the expense of the public.
The
Communications Act remedied only technical flaws in the
traditional system for regulating bottlenecks in digital
television. Fundamental problems such as a lack of efficient
protection for citizens and consumers in the regulation of
digital television infrastructure are still present. An adequate
regulatory response requires an acknowledgment of the “public
policy” implications of bottlenecks. The problem of bottlenecks
implicates a broad range of noneconomic interests including the
public’s definition not just as consumers but also as citizens.
We are witnessing a gradual transformation of the public
from active citizens into passive consumers. Anthony Varona
has said in the United States, “[i]nertia, not democratic
participation, is what modern commercial television seems to
Professor
Varona
identifies
a
best
promote.”192
communications sector in which the interest of advertisers
takes precedence over public-related concerns. Rather than
balancing the interest of the public with commercial interests,
the Act’s solution is to prioritize the interest of the public, by
placing on OFCOM the “primary duty” of safeguarding
citizenship and consumer interests. Whether such a solution
could be adapted in the United States is likely to trigger an
endless debate.193 What is certain, however, is that such an
190. Varona, supra note 1, at 115.
191. Remark attributed to Alex Haley, Creative Quotations: Quotations for
Creative
Thinking,
available
at
http://www.creativequotations.com/one/1422a.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
192. Varona, supra note 1, at 65.
193. See id. at 52-54. Varona states:
Although the FCC’s seven decades-old struggle to define the public
interest standard can be attributed in part to the shifts in political
winds and regulatory philosophies, as well as the vagueness of its
legislative origins, the fundamental cause of the FCC’s difficulty and
the doctrine’s failure is its inherent tension with the First
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approach will only work if it permeates the entire DTV supply
chain, rather than being limited to the consumer end.
Democratic regulatory rationales address not only content
but also structural and behavioral regulation. Unfortunately,
the Act considers pluralism and diversity implications only in
relation to content. It does not give enough emphasis to the
public policy implications of the bottlenecks challenge.
Furthermore, the Act reveals a tendency toward economic
regulation, as opposed to social regulation. It is therefore
necessary to return to democratic regulatory rationales and to
interpret the “public interest” along these lines. Furthermore,
regulation needs to be based on clear objectives in order to
protect adequately the interests of citizens and consumers.
Although the Act does refer to the primary duty of the
regulator to safeguard the interests of citizens and consumers,
the Act generally favors a departure from active regulatory
intervention, towards the application of competition law. A
competition-based approach to the regulation of bottlenecks is
concerned with balancing the interest of consumers with
commercial interests, and the public is viewed exclusively as
economic actors. Furthermore, ex post measures may come too
late to affect already well-established market players. In this
context, the analogy of “chasing the receding bus” can be
applied with full force.194
More effective protection of the public’s interest rests in
active regulatory intervention, which reflects the “public policy”
concerns associated with the bottlenecks challenge. In relation
to access and interoperability issues, the Act generally refers to
the public by using impersonal terms such as “consumers,”
“customers” or “end users.” In an era of rapid technological
advances in which the regulatory realm has become dominated
by market-related interests, it is legitimate to ask: when did we
stop being citizens?
Amendment . . . . At its essence then, this tension is one between two
conflicting interpretations of the First Amendment. On the one hand,
there is the perspective that the First Amendment is the notion of the
“free marketplace of ideas” that must be protected from all
government restriction and influence . . . . A related but somewhat
conflicting free speech theory is associated with James Madison . . . .
[T]he Madisonian perspective was not principally interested in
keeping the “marketplace of ideas” free from government interference,
but was concerned with ensuring that all voices were present and
heard in the marketplace.
194. See generally Mike Elliot, Chasing the Receding Bus: The
Broadcasting Act of 1980, 44 MODERN L. REV. 683 (1981).

VARNEY_FINAL_4-24-05

680

11/07/2006 18:43:59

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 6:2

STATUTORY APPENDIX
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 2003, C.21
(ENG.)
DEFINITIONS AND OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 32(1): “In this Act ‘electronic communications network’
means- (a) a transmission system for the conveyance, by the
use of electrical, magnetic or electro-magnetic energy, of signals
of any description; and (b) such of the following as are used, by
the person providing the system and in association with it, for
the conveyance of the signals- (i) apparatus comprised in the
system; (ii) apparatus used for the switching or routing of the
signals; and (iii) software and stored data.”
§ 32(2): “‘electronic communications service’ means a service
consisting in, or having as its principal feature, the conveyance
by means of an electronic communications network of signals,
except in so far as it is a content service.”
§ 32(3): “‘associated facility’ means a facility which- (a) is
available for use in association with the use of an electronic
communications network or electronic communications service
(whether or not one provided by the person making the facility
available); and (b) is so available for the purpose of- (i) making
the provision of that network or service possible; (ii) making
possible the provision of other services provided by means of
that network or service; or (iii) supporting the provision of such
other services.”
§ 74(3): “In this section . . . ‘electronic programme guide’ means
a facility by means of which a person has access to any service
which consists of- (a) the listing or promotion, or both the
listing and the promotion, of some or all of the programmes
included in any one or more programme services; and (b) a
facility for obtaining access, in whole or in part, to the
programme service or services listed or promoted in the guide.”
§ 74(3): “‘application programme interface’ means a facility for
allowing software to make use, in connection with any of the
matters mentioned in subsection (4), of facilities contained in
other software.”
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§ 74(4): “The matters mentioned in subsection (3) . . . are- (a)
allowing a person to have access to programme services; (b)
allowing a person, other than a communications provider or a
person who makes associated facilities available, to make use of
an electronic communications network by means of which a
programme service is broadcast or otherwise transmitted; (c)
allowing a person to become the end-user of a description of
public electronic communications service.”
§ 75(3): “In this section ‘conditional access system’ means any
system, facility, arrangements or technical measure under or
by means of which access to programme services requires- (a) a
subscription to the service or to a service that includes that
service; or (b) an authorisation to view it, or to listen to it, on a
particular occasion; . . . .”
§ 78(1): “For the purposes of this Chapter a person shall be
taken to have significant market power in relation to a market
if he enjoys a position which amounts to or is equivalent to
dominance of the market.”
§ 78(3): “A person is to be taken to enjoy a position of
dominance of a market if he is one of a number of persons who
enjoy such a position in combination with each other.”
§ 78(4): “A person or combination of persons may also be taken
to enjoy a position of dominance of a market by reason wholly
or partly of his or their position in a closely related market if
the links between the two markets allow the market power
held in the closely related market to be used in a way that
influences the other market so as to strengthen the position in
the other market of that person or combination of persons.”
FUNCTIONS OF OFCOM
§ 3(1)(a),(b): “It shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in
carrying out their functions- (a) to further the interests of
citizens in relation to communications matters; and (b) to
further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where
appropriate by promoting competition.”
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§ 3(2)(c): “OFCOM are required to secure in the carrying out of
their functions . . . the availability . . . of a wide range of
television . . . services which (taken as a whole) are both of high
quality and calculated to appeal to a variety of tastes and
interests.”
§ 3(3)(a): “OFCOM must have regard, . . . to- . . . the principles
under which regulatory activities should be transparent,
accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at
cases in which action is needed; . . . .”
§ 4(3): “The first Community requirement is a requirement to
promote competition- . . . .”
§ 4(4): “The second Community requirement is a requirement
to secure that OFCOM's activities contribute to the
development of the European internal market.”
§ 4(5): “The third Community requirement is a requirement to
promote the interests of all persons who are citizens of the
European Union . . . .”
§ 4(7): “The fifth Community requirement is a requirement to
encourage, to such extent as OFCOM consider appropriate for
the purpose mentioned in subsection (8), the provision of
network access and service interoperability.”
§ 6(1)(a),(b): “Duties to review regulatory burdens . . . OFCOM
must keep the carrying out of their functions under review with
a view to securing that regulation by OFCOM does not involve(a) the imposition of burdens which are unnecessary; or (b) the
maintenance of burdens which have become unnecessary.”
DUTIES TO REVIEW REGULATORY BURDENS
§ 45(2): “A condition set by OFCOM under this section must be
either- (a) a general condition; or (b) a condition of one of the
following descriptions- (i) a universal service condition; (ii) an
access-related condition; (iii) a privileged supplier condition;
(iv) a significant market power condition (an ‘SMP condition’).”
§ 47(2): “[The] [t]est for setting or modifying conditions . . . is
that the condition or modification is- (a) objectively justifiable
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in relation to the networks, services, facilities, apparatus or
directories to which it relates; (b) not such as to discriminate
unduly against particular persons or against a particular
description of persons; (c) proportionate to what the condition
or modification is intended to achieve; and (d) in relation to
what it is intended to achieve, transparent.”
§ 64(1): “Must-carry obligations . . . General conditions may
include conditions making any provision that OFCOM consider
appropriate for securing that particular services are broadcast
or otherwise transmitted by means of the electronic
communications networks described in the conditions.”
§ 73(2): “Access-related conditions may include conditions . . .
for the purpose of securing- (a) efficiency on the part of
communications providers and persons making associated
facilities available; (b) sustainable competition between them;
and (c) the greatest possible benefit for the end-users of public
electronic communications services.”
§ 74(2): “The conditions that may be set by virtue of section
73(2) also include such conditions . . . necessary for securing(a) that persons are able to have access to such programme
services provided in digital form as OFCOM may determine;
and (b) that the facility for using those interfaces or guides is
provided on terms which- (i) are fair and reasonable; and (ii) do
not involve, or tend to give rise to, any undue discrimination
against any person or description of persons.”
§ 75(2): “It shall be the duty of OFCOM to ensure- (a) that
access-related conditions are applied to every person who
provides a conditional access system in relation to a protected
programme service; . . . .”
§ 87(3): “This section authorises SMP conditions requiring the
dominant provider to give such entitlements as OFCOM may
from time to time direct as respects- (a) the provision of
network access to the relevant network; (b) the use of the
relevant network; and (c) the availability of the relevant
facilities.”
§ 87(4): “In determining what conditions authorised by
subsection (3) to set in a particular case, OFCOM must take
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into account, in particular, the following factors- (a) the
technical and economic viability, . . . (b) the feasibility of the
provision of the proposed network access; (c) the investment
made by the person initially providing or making available the
network . . . (d) the need to secure effective competition in the
long term; (e) any rights to intellectual property that are
relevant . . . and (f) the desirability of securing that electronic
communications services are provided that are available
throughout the member States.”
REGULATORY PROVISIONS
§ 310(1): “It shall be the duty of OFCOM to draw up, and from
time to time to review and revise, a code giving guidance as to
the practices to be followed in the provision of electronic
programme guides.”
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 2002 DRAFT COMMUNICATIONS
BILL
FUNCTIONS OF OFCOM
cl. (3)(1)(a): “It shall be the duty of OFCOM . . . to further the
interests of the persons who are customers for the services and
facilities in relation to which OFCOM have functions.”
cl. 3(2)(a): “In performing their duties . . . OFCOM shall have
regard, in particular, to . . . the principles under which
regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable,
proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which
action is needed; . . . .”
cl. 5(1)(a),(b): “OFCOM shall keep the carrying out of their
functions under review with a view to securing that regulation
by OFCOM does not involve-(a) the imposition of burdens
which are unnecessary; or (b) the maintenance of burdens
which have become unnecessary.”
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/19/EC,
2002 O.J. (L 108) [ACCESS DIRECTIVE]
Recital 10: “Competition rules alone may not be sufficient to
ensure cultural diversity and media pluralism in the area of
digital television.”
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Art. 5(1): “National regulatory authorities shall, acting in
pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 8 of Directive
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), encourage and where
appropriate ensure . . . adequate access and interconnection,
and interoperability of services, exercising their responsibility
in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, and
gives the maximum benefit to end-users. In particular, without
prejudice to measures that may be taken regarding
undertakings with significant market power in accordance with
Article 8, national regulatory authorities shall be able to
impose: . . . (b) to the extent that is necessary to ensure
accessibility for end-users to digital . . . television broadcasting
services specified by the Member State, obligations on
operators to provide access to the other facilities referred to in
Annex I, Part II on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms.”
Annex I; Part II: “Other facilities to which conditions may be
applied under Article 5(1)(b): (a) Access to application program
interfaces (APIs); (b) Access to electronic programme guides
(EPGs).”
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC,
2002 O.J. (L 108) [FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE]
Recital 30: “Standardisation should remain primarily a
market-driven process. However there may still be situations
where it is appropriate to require compliance with specified
standards at Community level to ensure interoperability in the
single market. ”
Art. 8(2): “The national regulatory authorities shall promote
competition in the provision of electronic communications
networks, electronic communications services and associated
facilities and services by inter alia: (a) ensuring that users,
including disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms of
choice, price, and quality; (b) ensuring that there is no
distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic
communications sector; (c) encouraging efficient investment in
infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and (d) encouraging
efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio
frequencies and numbering resources.”

